Introduction

Following the 2015 murder of Boris Nemtsov, online accounts accused Ukrainians of having killed him:

<aside> <img src="/icons/map-pin_gray.svg" alt="/icons/map-pin_gray.svg" width="40px" /> The Russian government’s army of social media propagandists at the Internet Research Agency was immediately up and running, and a recently leaked document sheds light on how those propagandists were instructed to spin out stories of Nemtsov’s homicide… Nemtsov was murdered at 11:30 that night in February 2015, and the Kremlin’s social media strategy was immediately ready for action.

Philip N. Howard, Lie Machines (p. 31)

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In 2014, when Russian proxy forces in Russian-occupied Ukraine shot down Malaysian Airlines flight MH17, Russia’s [online propaganda operations](https://theconversation.com/russian-trolls-targeted-australian-voters-on-twitter-via-auspol-and-mh17-101386#:~:text=Our analysis of this data set shows how these accounts targeted Australian politics – particularly in reaction to the Australian response to the downing of flight MH17. Some 5%2C000 tweets mention the terms “%23auspol”%2C “Australia” or “MH17” – with “Australia” the most common of the three.) and Kremlin representatives accused Ukraine and denied involvement. Evidence later demonstrated that Russia had been responsible for shooting down MH17 and killing the 298 people aboard.

In 2012, Russia’s allies in Syria used chemical weapons on civilians.  Russia released a flood of disinformation, denying the use of chemical weapons and smearing a humanitarian group called the White Helmets. The White Helmets had documented victims they rescued from the chemical attacks. Sources funded by the Russian state accused the White Helmets of being terrorists who used chemical weapons on civilians. The claims about the White Helmets were false in both cases.

Given Russia’s history of attempting to shape perceptions around events strategically important to the Kremlin, Hoaxlines examined the earliest messages about the Nord Stream pipeline attack. This analysis should not be viewed as evidence that Russia had foreknowledge of the event. However, it does show that Russian state actors and their fellow travelers began to shape the public discussion at the first sign of trouble.

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NOTE: Please read the disclaimer to understand what this report does and does not show.

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Narratives in public discussion →

tags: NordStream